内容正文:
The cyberwar in Ukraine
The digital front
Ukraine has shown how cyber-defence can prevail
Wars are testbeds for new technology. The Korean war saw jet fighters 1.________(employed) at scale for the first time. Israel pioneered the use of drones as radar decoys in its war with Egypt in 1973. And the Gulf war of 1991 was a coming-out party for GPS-guided munitions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first time 2.__________(that) two mature cyber-powers have fought each other over computer networks in wartime. The result is a lesson in the limits of cyber-power and the importance of having a sound defence.
The popular notion of cyberwar has been shaped by lurid and dystopian scenarios of an “electronic Pearl Harbour”, first envisaged in the 1990s and accentuated by the relentless digitisation of society. Those fears have been fanned by glimpses of the possible. The American-Israeli Stuxnet worm, 3._______(which) came to light in 2010, inflicted damage on Iranian nuclear machinery with fiendish ingenuity. Russian malware sabotaged Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 and 2016.
Yet when a full-blown cyberwar came to Ukraine, the result was modest. This was not for want of trying. Russia has thrown vast amounts of malware at Ukraine—the largest onslaught ever, say some officials. There were some notable successes, such as the disruption of Viasat, a commercial satellite-communications service used by Ukraine’s government and 4. ________ (armed) forces, less than an hour 5._________ (before) the invasion.
But, despite Russia’s cyber-warriors, Ukraine’s lights, power and water stayed on. The banks remained open. Perhaps most important, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, continued to make nightly television broadcasts to the nation. How?
Part of the answer lies in Russia’s missteps. It limited its initial strikes because it assumed that Ukrainian infrastructure would soon come 6.________(under) its control. Russia’s cyber-forces also have less experience of integrating