内容正文:
PUBLIC FINANCE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
Chapter 22
1
Background
Federal system
Fiscal federalism
Centralization
Centralization ratio =
Central government expenditures
Total government expenditures
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2
Distribution of All U.S. Expenditures by Government Level
22-3
Source: Figures for 1900 through 1980 are from Pommerehne [1977]. Figures after 1980 are computed from various editions of the US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States , and from US Bureau of the Census [2012b].
3
Community Formation
Club – voluntary association of people who band together to finance and share some benefit
Optimal Club (or community)
22-4
4
The Tiebout Model
Voting with your feet
Tiebout’s assumptions
Government activities generate no externalities
Individuals are completely mobile
People have perfect information with respect to each community’s public services and taxes
There are enough different communities so that each individual can find one with public services meeting her demands
The cost per unit of public services is constant so that if the quantity of public services doubles, the total cost also doubles
Public services are financed by a proportional property tax
Communities can enact exclusionary zoning laws—statutes that prohibit certain uses of land
22-5
5
Tiebout and the Real World
Critique of Tiebout
Empirical tests
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6
Optimal Federalism
What is the optimal allocation of economic responsibilities among levels of government?
Macroeconomic functions
Microeconomic functions
22-7
7
Disadvantages of a Decentralized System
Efficiency issues
Externalities
Local public good
Scale economies in provision of public goods
Inefficient tax systems
Scale economies in tax collection
Equity issues
22-8
8
Advantages of a Decentralized System
Tailoring outputs to local taxes
Fostering intergovernmental competition
Experimentation and information in locally provided goods and services
22-9
9
Implications
Purely decentralized systems cannot maximize social welfare