内容正文:
PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
C h a p t e r 5
Political Equilibrium
Public choice – one made through political interaction of many people according to established rules
Political equilibrium – an agreement on the level of production of one or more public goods, given the specified rule for making the collective choice and the distribution of tax shares among individuals
Tax shares – preannounced levies assigned to citizens; equal to a portion of the unit cost of a good proposed to be provided by government
Elections and Voting
Economic analysis assumes that people evaluate government goods in the same way as market goods and vote in favor of a proposal only if they will be made better off by its passage.
The most-preferred political outcome is the quantity of the government-supplied good corresponding to the point at which the person’s tax share is exactly equal to the marginal benefit of the good.
Elections and Voting
Elections and Voting
Many citizens choose not to vote because:
The cost of time and effort to vote outweighs the perceived benefit.
They believe that their votes do not make any difference.
They may see little or no difference between the alternatives considered in the election.
They have scanty information.
Rational ignorance – lack of information about public issues that results because the marginal cost of obtaining the information exceeds the apparent marginal benefits of doing so
Determinants of Political Equilibrium
Public choice rule; the proportion of yes votes in relation to the number of votes required for approval of the issue
Average and marginal costs of the public good
Information available to voters on the cost and benefit associated with the issue
Distribution of tax shares among voters and the way in which extra taxes vary with extra output of the good provided
Distribution of benefits among voters
Political Equilibrium Under Majority Rule
An example:
Under simple majority rule, citizens must decide on the quantity of a p